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ABSTRACT 
This research examines the moderating role of regret aversion in reason-based choice. 
Earlier research has shown that regret aversion and reason-based choice effects are linked 
through a common emphasis on decision justification, and that a simple manipulation of regret 
salience can eliminate the decoy effect, a well-known reason-based choice effect. We show here 
that the effect of regret salience varies in theory-relevant ways from one reason-based choice 
effect to another. For effects such as the select/reject and decoy effect, both of which were 
independently judged to be unreasonable bases for deciding, regret salience eliminated the effect. 
For the most-important attribute effect that is judged to be normatively acceptable, however, 
regret salience amplified the effect. Anticipated self-blame regret and perceived decision 
justifiability consistently predicted preferences and thus offer a parsimonious account of both 
attenuation and amplification of these reason-based choice effects.  
 
KEYWORDS: Decision Justification; Reason-Based Choice; Regret; Regret Aversion; Decoy 
effect; Accept/Reject Effect; Most Important Attribute Effect. 
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The Moderating Role of Regret Aversion in Reason-Based Choice 
 
 Research on decision-related regret, disappointment and related emotions stems from two 
distinct research traditions. Economic choice theorists (e.g. Bell, 1982, 1985; Loomes & Sugden, 
1982, 1986; Irons & Hepburn, 2007; Ozerol & Karasakal, 2008; Bleichrodt, Cillo & Diecidue, 
2010) aim to improve the descriptive validity of standard Expected Utility models of choice 
under uncertainty by introducing variables representing expected emotions. The existence and 
intensity of these emotions is inferred from actual choice behavior (for example, between 
monetary gambles), supplemented by the researchers’ intuitions of their own emotional 
responses, rather than from direct measurement. Psychological research on regret, in contrast, 
relies heavily on self-report measures of expected emotional reactions to hypothetical events 
(e.g. Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Connolly, Ordóñez & Coughlan, 1997; Gilovich & Medvec, 
1994; Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002).  The advantages and drawbacks of these two approaches have 
been widely debated, especially the tension between psychological realism and formal 
tractability (see Rabin, 2002, and Ortmann & Hertwig, 2002, for  extended and insightful 
discussions). A study using a hybrid of self-report and actual choice measures (Connolly & 
Butler, 2006) showed some convergence between the two methodologies (for example, inclusion 
of self-report expected-emotion measures improved prediction of actual choices between 
significant real-money gambles), but only modest convergence between self-report measures of 
regret and the patterns predicted by an economic regret-theory model.  
 The research reported in the present paper is firmly in the psychological tradition. We are 
concerned with the characteristics of choice situations in which people expect to experience 
regret and the effects of such expectations on the choices they make and the decision processes 
they use. A convenient starting point is a much-cited study by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) in 
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which subjects read a brief scenario featuring two investors who each loses $1,200 as a result of 
owning a certain stock, Stock A. One investor initially owned a different stock, Stock B, but 
switched to Stock A. The other considered Stock B but decided to hold onto his Stock A. 
Subjects were asked to predict which of the two would experience more regret at his loss. An 
astonishing 95% felt that the investor who switched would experience more regret. This was 
interpreted as evidence that unfortunate outcomes resulting from action are more regrettable than 
identical outcomes resulting from inaction. This so-called “action effect” was thought to lead to 
an “omission bias” in which, for example, non-vaccination (inaction) would be preferred to 
vaccination (action) when disease effects and vaccination side-effects were equivalent (Ritov & 
Baron, 1990, 1992; Baron & Ritov, 1994. See Connolly & Reb, 2002, for a detailed critique of 
these studies). 
 Subsequent research painted a more complex pattern. Gilovich and Medvec (1994) 
showed that action-regret linkages could reverse over time. Seta, McElroy and Seta (2001) found 
the two-investors effect reversed if the protagonists were described as entrepreneurial 
businessmen rather than ordinary risk-averse savers: entrepreneurs were expected to regret loss 
from inaction more. Zeelenberg et al (2002) asked participants how much regret a soccer coach 
would feel if his team lost after he either changed or did not change the team. As with the two 
investors, the active coach was seen as more regretful than the inactive coach, but only if the 
team had previously enjoyed a winning record. If they had a losing record, loss after inaction was 
regretted more. Inman and Zeelenberg (2002) compared consumers who bought an 
unsatisfactory product either switching brands or staying with a previously-purchased brand. The 
predicted regret depended on the consumer’s prior experience with the brand. If prior experience 
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with the initial brand had been poor, switching was seen as less regrettable than if prior 
experience with the initial brand had been good. 
 Drawing on these and other studies, Connolly and Zeelenberg (2002) proposed Decision 
Justification Theory (DJT). The theory has two central propositions. First, it proposes that 
decision-related regret has two components, one associated with an assessment of the outcome 
(“outcome regret”), the other with the decision process that led to the alternative chosen 
(“process” or “self-blame” regret). Second it argues that the two components are driven by rather 
different mechanisms. Outcome regret is driven by comparison of the actual outcome with some 
reference point (sometimes the outcome of an unchosen alternative, sometimes other reference 
points such as the status quo, the expected outcome, or the outcome received by another person. 
See, for example, Connolly, Ordóñez & Coughlan, 1997; Ordóñez & Connolly, 2000). Process 
regret, in contrast, is driven by the individual’s assessment of whether or not the decision was 
justified. For example, Zeelenberg et al’s (2002) soccer coaches’ decision to change their team is 
seen as justified (and therefore not blame-worthy or regrettable) if the team had recently been 
losing but not if they had been winning. Seta et al’s (2001) entrepreneurial investors were 
justified in taking action (switching their investments) because that is what entrepreneurs do. 
Inman and Zeelenberg’s (2002) brand-changers were justified in deciding to switch brands by 
their poor prior experience with the old brand. Reb and Connolly (2010) found that mothers 
whose vaccination decisions for their babies led to poor outcomes were expected to feel less 
regret when they were based on careful thought, consultation with several doctors and active 
gathering of relevant information than when they were made casually or carelessly. Indeed, 
although some justifications are specific to particular actions and settings (such as what soccer 
coaches or entrepreneurs are expected to do), the use of a careful, thoughtful, well-informed 
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decision process – what Janis and Mann (1977) termed a “vigilant” decision process – seems to 
be a general-purpose regret-reducing justification across many contexts. 
If careless decisions are expected to lead to more regret than careful decisions when each 
yields a poor outcome, does the converse also hold? Does sensitizing people to possible regret 
motivate more careful decision processes? Recent evidence suggests that it does. Reb (2008) 
found that subjects primed to think about regret invested more effort, acquired more information, 
thought longer about their decisions, and made better final decisions than did those not so 
primed. Kugler, Connolly and Kausel (2009) showed that regret priming can motivate more 
rational play in experimental games. Even quite subtle, unconscious priming of one or other type 
of regret can influence choice behavior. In a repeated decision task Reb and Connolly (2009) 
showed that unconscious priming of outcome regret led subjects to reject potentially painful 
feedback on the outcomes of unchosen alternatives. This feedback rejection impeded their task 
learning and reduced their final earnings (a trap we refer to as “myopic regret avoidance”). In 
contrast subjects unconsciously primed for process regret accepted the short-term pain of seeing 
that their outcomes could have been better, learned more about the task, and ended up 
performing better.  
In short, just as poor decision processes lead to increased regret, making possible regret 
salient can lead to improved decision processes. We now turn to a class of decision biases in 
which decision justification seems to be central, and which should therefore be responsive to the 
enhanced demand for a justifiable decision process which, we have argued, comes with increased 
salience of decision process regret. 
Reason-Based Choice Effects 
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Several authors (Montgomery, 1983; Pettibone & Wedell, 2000; Simonson, 1989; Slovic, 
1975; Tversky, 1972) have written about how the reasons and justifications the decision maker 
sees for and against the available alternatives influence decision making. Interestingly, the desire 
to make justifiable decisions can sometimes lead to choices that violate the norms of rational 
decision making (Barber, Heath, & Odean, 2003; Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982; Simonson, 1989). 
Choices based on “shallow but nice-sounding rationales” (Simonson, 1989, p. 170) may be seen 
as more justifiable than decisions based on more thorough, rational processes (Slovic, Fischhoff, 
& Lichtenstein, 1976). Research has documented a number of these “reason-based choice 
effects” (RBCEs), and in many of them the desire for easy justification leads to violations of 
various basic principles of rational choice (Shafir, Tversky, & Simonson, 1993; Mercier & 
Sperber, in press). 
A well-known example is the asymmetric dominance or “decoy” (or attraction) effect 
(Huber, Payne, & Puto 1982). Imagine a choice between two options that do not dominate each 
other (i.e., each option is better than the other on at least one attribute). Huber et al found that 
introducing a third, “decoy” option that is dominated by only one of the original options 
significantly increases the frequency with which the dominating option is chosen. This effect 
violates the fundamental normative principle of regularity (Luce, 1977). Apparently, however, 
the normatively irrelevant decoy option, though very rarely chosen, provides at least some 
subjects with a plausible reason for choosing the dominating option.  
RBCEs such as the decoy effect have been found for a variety of choice domains 
including consumer choice (Huber et al, 1982; Simonson, 1989) and workplace decisions 
(Highhouse, 1996; Slaughter, Sinar, & Highhouse, 1999). They have been replicated using a 
variety of methods, including studies using hypothetical scenarios (e.g., Shafir, 1993) and video-
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vignettes (Slaughter et al, 1999), in choices with real monetary or other material incentives 
(Simonson & Tversky, 1992), and using both between- and within-subjects designs (Huber et al, 
1982).  
There is evidence that justifiability perceptions mediate experimentally induced RBCEs 
(Pettibone & Wedell, 2000). Simonson (1989) found stronger RBCEs when decision makers 
expected to be asked to justify their decisions to others (cf. Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). In a recent 
study (Connolly, Reb & Kausel, 2010) we explored the contrasting effects of justification to 
others and justification to oneself in the decoy effect. In one experiment a control condition 
replicated the usual decoy effect for a choice between two job offers. In a second condition, 
subjects were asked to think about the regret they would feel if they made a poor choice and 
ended up in an unsatisfying job. This manipulation entirely eliminated the decoy effect. In a 
second experiment we replicated this result for two different choice tasks, and also added a third 
condition in which subjects were told they might have to explain their choice to an external 
audience. As before, making regret salient (which the subjects experienced as a demand to justify 
their choices to themselves) eliminated the decoy effect, but the accountability manipulation 
(which was seen as requiring justification to others) had no impact on the decoy effect in one 
task, and significantly exacerbated it in the other.  
The present paper extends the research to two other RBCEs, the select/reject effect 
(Shafir, 1993) and the most important attribute effect (Slovic, 1975). The first is, like the decoy 
effect, generally agreed to be normatively violative, while the second is not. The select/reject 
effect is a choice anomaly in which a decision maker’s preference ordering reverses depending 
on whether the choice task is selecting the option she likes more or rejecting the option she likes 
less. For example Shafir (1993) presented subjects with an imaginary choice between an 
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enriched option (which had some very positive and some very negative attributes) and an 
impoverished option (which had moderate values on all attributes). He found that the enriched 
option was selected more often when the task was to choose a winner, but was also rejected more 
often when the task was to choose a loser (thus making the impoverished option the winner). 
Shafir argued that this shift in choice frequencies resulted from the fact that the enriched option 
offers more explanatory features than the impoverished option. The extreme positive attribute 
scores can be used to justify selecting this option if selection is called for; the extreme negative 
scores can be used to justify rejecting it if rejection is required. However, the effect violates the 
fundamental normative principle of procedural invariance (Shafir, 1993; Shafir et al, 1993).  
The other RBCE we consider here is the most-important attribute (MIA) effect (Slovic, 
1975). Slovic asked participants to choose between pairs of two-attribute options that they had 
previously equated in value. They also judged which of the two attributes they considered more 
important. For example, participants read a description of two auto tires in terms of tread life and 
cost. Both attribute scores were given for one tire, only one score for the other, and the 
participants were asked to fill in the score on the missing attribute that would make the two 
options equally attractive to them. Later, they judged which attribute, tread life or cost, they 
considered more important. Finally, they chose between the two tires. Results across several such 
choices showed that participants tended to choose the option scoring higher on the attribute they 
previously had rated as more important. Slovic argued that the effect was the result of people 
making a choice they found easy to justify. Since the option pairs were equated for overall 
attractiveness, a second criterion is needed to choose between them. Choosing the option that is 
better on the dimension one cares about more appears to serve as a tie-breaking rationale that 
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allows one to move beyond decision paralysis. The most-important attribute effect thus violates 
no normative principle and offers some practical advantage.  
 Our purpose in these studies is to further probe the somewhat subtle interplay of regret 
aversion, decision justification, and RBCEs within the Decision Justification Theory framework. 
Our examination of this interplay in the decoy effect (Connolly et al, 2010) showed that 
requiring justification to others (via the accountability manipulation) can exacerbate a RBCE, 
while requiring justification to oneself (via regret priming) can reduce or eliminate it. If our 
theorizing is correct, we would expect regret priming to similarly reduce or eliminate the 
select/reject effect, since the assumed justification driving the effect does not survive careful 
scrutiny. However in the MIA effect, the assumed justification seems normatively neutral and 
offers some practical advantage in the form of tie-breaking. In this case we would expect the 
assumed justification to survive, or even be strengthened by, the enhanced scrutiny stimulated by 
regret priming. In short, just as Connolly et al (2010) found contrasting effects for requiring 
justification to others and justification to oneself, we predict here contrasting effects of regret 
priming when the assumed justification is non-normative (as in the select/reject effect) and when 
it is normatively acceptable (as in the MIA effect). 
 These predictions presuppose that our subject pool shares our intuitions as to when an 
RBCE is normatively acceptable and when it is not – that is, that the decoy and select/reject 
effects both represent decision errors, while the MIA effect does not. We examine this 
supposition in the Pretest reported in the following section. Subsequent sections report 
experiments testing the effects of regret priming on the select/reject effect (Study 1) and the MIA 
effect (Study 2). The final section integrates these results within the framework of Decision 
Justification Theory. 
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EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 
Pretest 
We wanted to test whether our subject population agreed with the conceptual argument 
made above. Do they consider the MIA effect as more normatively acceptable than the decoy 
and select/reject effects? Thirty-two undergraduate students from the same population as that 
used in the main studies completed a short questionnaire in return for class credit. The 
questionnaire presented, in counterbalanced orders, three short scenarios each describing the 
behavior of an individual who demonstrates one reason-based choice effect: the decoy effect, the 
select/reject effect, and the MIA effect (full versions of the scenarios are available from the 
authors).  
Respondents were asked to rate the choice behavior described as to whether or not it is 
reasonable, makes sense, is rational, is justifiable, and is something the respondent would do. 
Responses were made on five-point (1-5) scales on which higher values indicated less reasonable 
etc. decisions. Scores on the five items were strongly intercorrelated within scenarios and were 
averaged into simple justifiability indices for each scenario (minimum coefficient alpha = .85). 
ANOVA showed a significant main effect for scenario, F(2, 56) = 16.77, p < .001, and no 
significant interaction with, or main effect for, order, Fs < 1. As expected, further analyses (all p 
< .001) showed that the select/reject effect (M = 3.26, SD = 1.14) and the decoy effect (M = 3.07, 
SD = 1.13) were considered significantly less justifiable than the MIA effect (M = 1.86, SD = 
.77) but not significantly different from each other. Thus, the present subject population agrees 
with the conceptual argument that the MIA effect is distinctly more reasonable than the 
select/reject and the asymmetric dominance effects.  
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EXPERIMENT 1: THE SELECT/REJECT EFFECT 
We examined the effect of regret salience on the select/reject effect. Following Connolly 
et al (2010), we predicted that the effect will be reduced or eliminated when regret is made 
salient. In other words, we expected an interaction effect such that the select/reject effect will be 
weaker in the regret condition (i.e., when regret salience is high) than in the control condition 
(i.e., when regret salience is low).  
Method 
Design, Procedure, and Participants 
We presented decision makers with a hypothetical decision between two jobs. The 
“enriched” job had several very attractive and several very unattractive attributes; the 
“impoverished” job was moderately attractive on all attributes.  Depending on the choice task 
condition, participants were asked either to select or to reject one of the two jobs. They were then 
asked, for each job, to rate how justifiable they would judge having chosen the job if it later 
turned out to be unsatisfactory. We also manipulated regret salience. In the regret condition, but 
not in the control condition, the possibility of experiencing regret as a consequence of their 
choice was made salient to respondents. In sum, the experiment had a 2 (choice task: select 
versus reject) x 2 (regret salience: control versus regret) between-subjects factorial design.  
Seventy undergraduate business students at a large Southwestern public university 
participated for course credit as part of a larger experiment session. They took about 10 minutes 
to complete the questionnaire. 
 Materials, Manipulation, and Measures 
Participants were asked to imagine themselves faced with a choice between two job 
offers. In the select condition they read: 
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Imagine that you applied for a new job and you received two offers. You have had 
several days to think about which of the two jobs to select. However, the time has come 
now to make a decision and keep one of the two offers.  
Participants in the reject condition read: 
Imagine that you applied for a new job and you received two offers. Because you 
have indicated interest in both offers the companies have kept their offers open for you 
for several days. However, the time has come now to make a decision and reject one of 
the two offers. 
Next, the options were described with presentation order counterbalanced. Six attributes were 
specified for each: vacation time, amount of training, stress, location quality, chance of 
promotion, and benefits. For the “impoverished” job, all attributes were described as average, 
medium, okay or moderate. For the “enriched” job three attributes were very attractive 
(outstanding training, excellent location, and great benefits) and three were very unattractive 
(very short vacations, high stress, and low chance of promotion).  
In the high regret salience condition only, the job descriptions were followed by this 
paragraph: 
Because the job market is relatively tight these days you know that your decision 
won’t be easy to reverse and you will most likely have to stick with your job for a 
considerable time. Thus, should you end up not liking your job you will have a lot of time 
to regret your decision. 
We assessed preference in two ways. First, we assessed the job choice as indicated by the select 
or reject decision. Second, we measured relative strength of preference on a scale anchored at -
100 (“I strongly prefer Job A”) and 100 (“I strongly prefer Job B”). The results for these two 
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dependent variables mirrored each other. We present here only the analyses for relative strength 
of preference as this continuous dependent variable allows for more powerful parametric 
statistical tests. Strength of preference was coded such that higher values indicate preference for 
the impoverished option. This means that a select/reject effect would show itself in higher scores 
in the reject condition, because the enriched option is less preferred in this condition than in the 
select condition.   
On the next page participants were asked to imagine the following for both the enriched 
and impoverished job: “After a while on your new job, you find out that you do not like it much 
at all. In fact, you find the job situation you are in now to be very dissatisfying.” For both jobs 
they then rated the perceived justifiability of the decision on four items (“I made a justifiable 
decision”; “I regret my decision”; “I feel self-blame”; and “I made a bad decision”) on 7-point 
Likert-scales anchored at “completely agree” (1) and “completely disagree” (7). The responses 
were reverse-coded as necessary such that higher values indicate higher perceived justifiability, 
and summed for each job. A perceived justifiability scale was computed by subtracting the score 
for the impoverished option from the score for the enriched option.  
Results 
Moderating Effect of Regret Salience on the Select/Reject Effect 
A 2 (choice task) x 2 (regret salience) between-subjects ANOVA showed a significant 
interaction between choice task and regret salience on relative strength of preference, F(1, 66) = 
9.12, p < .01 (see Figure 1 for means). As expected, regret salience attenuated the select/reject 
effect. Further analyses revealed that in the control condition, the select/reject effect was 
replicated. As expected, the enriched option was less preferred in the reject condition than in the 
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select condition, F(1, 33) = 6.97, p < .05. In the regret-salient condition, however, the choice task 
(select or reject) did not significantly affect preferences , F(1, 33) = 2.44, ns.  
------------------------------ 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
The Role of Perceived Justifiability 
To examine the role of perceived justifiability we conducted several analyses. First, a 
regression analysis showed perceived justifiability as a significant predictor of relative strength 
of preference, B = 15.16, SE(B) = 3.34, β = .48, t(68) = 4.54, p < .001. Second, an ANOVA with 
choice task and regret salience as independent variables showed the expected interaction on 
perceived justifiability, F(1, 66) = 6.14, p < .05. Further analyses showed that, as with 
preferences, choice task significantly affected justifiability perceptions in the control condition 
such that the enriched option was considered a less justifiable choice when rejecting (M = -1.04, 
SD = 1.20) than when selecting an option (M = .17, SD = 1.37), F(1, 33) = 7.74, p < .01. In the 
regret condition, the effect of choice task was not significant (M = -.78, SD = 1.46, select, M = -
.46, SD = 1.10, reject), F(1, 33) = .54, ns. Thus, the effect of regret salience on perceived 
justifiability mirrored its effect on decision makers’ preferences.  
Discussion 
This experiment examined the potential attenuating influence of heightened regret 
salience on the select/reject effect (Shafir, 1993). Respondents either selected or rejected one of 
two job offers, one of which was “enriched” (attribute scores widely varied), the other 
“impoverished” (attribute scores all mediocre). The possibility of experiencing regret as a result 
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of their decision was made salient to participants in the regret condition, but not in the control 
condition.  
The results were consistent with the predicted moderating role of regret aversion. We 
found a significant interaction effect of choice task (select vs. reject) and regret salience on 
preferences. The original select/reject effect was replicated in the control condition:  preference 
for the enriched option was weaker in the “reject” task than in the “select” task. When regret was 
made salient, however, preferences were not significantly affected by whether the task was to 
select or to reject an option. The results are consistent with the idea that making regret salient can 
lead to more vigilant decision processing, by weakening or eliminating the influence of the 
normatively irrelevant select/reject task feature. Perceived justifiability played a key role in these 
results. As in the earlier decoy effect study (Connolly et al, 2010), making regret salient led to a 
more critical appraisal of the justification driving the RBCE, eliminating the effect. 
As discussed earlier RBCE mechanisms have also been identified in choice situations in 
which the evoked justifications are substantively appropriate (or, at least, not clearly 
inappropriate) rather than merely superficially convincing. In such situations the 
reasons/justifications for choosing different options may be retained even after careful 
deliberation. If, as we have argued, heightened regret salience generally leads to more vigilant, 
careful decision processing (Connolly & Reb, 2005; Janis & Mann, 1977; Reb, 2008), 
heightened regret should generate an increased preference for the reason-based option in such 
cases. Experiment 2 tested this reasoning, using the most important attribute effect first 
demonstrated by Slovic (1975). 
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EXPERIMENT 2: THE MOST IMPORTANT ATTRIBUTE EFFECT 
Method 
Design, Procedure, and Participants 
Participants matched descriptions of two bicycles on two attributes (price and ride 
quality) so that they were indifferent between them. They then indicated which attribute they 
considered more important. After that, they chose between the two matched options. For about 
half the respondents we made regret salient by reminding them that their choice might turn out 
badly and that they might regret it. After the choice respondents indicated their anticipated regret 
for each bicycle assuming they had chosen it and it turned out to be unsatisfactory.  
Seventy-eight undergraduate business students at a large Southwestern public university 
participated in exchange for course credit. They took about 5-10 minutes to complete the study 
on a computer. Two individuals were excluded for giving a match value indicating that they 
would prefer a more expensive bicycle with a worse ride quality. Eight participants rated both 
attributes equally important and, therefore, could not be used in the analyses. Two additional 
participants were excluded for missing data.    
Materials, Manipulation, and Measures 
After going through an example of the matching procedure, participants were asked to 
match two bicycles such that they were equally preferable to them. Bicycle A had a price of $299 
and a ride quality of 30 (on a 0-100 scale with higher values being better). Bicycle B had a price 
of $599. Participants were asked to enter the ride quality that made the two bicycles equally 
attractive to them. The average ride quality matching value was 63.56 and was independent of 
the regret salience condition. Only one person gave the maximum value of 100.  
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Participants then rated the relative importance of the two attributes (price and ride 
quality) by splitting up 100 points between them. Mean importance of the two attributes was 
almost equal (M = 48.27 for price, M = 52.48 for ride quality, not affected by regret salience). 
Participants then continued to the choice task. Here, we also implemented the regret salience 
manipulation (shown in parentheses below):                        
Imagine you had to choose between the two bicycles you just evaluated. [You know 
that your choice might turn out to be wrong and that you might regret it.] Which option 
do you choose?      
Participants saw the two options with all four attribute values including the one they had earlier 
generated themselves. They made their choice between the two bicycles. Because regret salience 
did not affect which bicycle was chosen, χ2(1) = .22, ns, we collapsed across this variable in the 
results section. 
Participants were then asked to imagine for each bicycle (both the one chosen and the one 
not chosen) that the bicycle had turned out to be unsatisfactory. They then rated the perceived 
justifiability of their decision as before on four items (“I made a justifiable decision”; “I regret 
my decision”; “I feel self-blame”; and “I made a bad decision”) on 7-point Likert scales 
anchored at “completely agree” (1) and “completely disagree” (7). The responses were reverse-
coded as necessary such that higher values indicate higher perceived justifiability; difference 
scores were formed by subtracting the value of the “lower MIA” option from the value of the 
“higher MIA” option; and these scores combined into a perceived justifiability scale (α = .82) on 
which values above zero indicate higher perceived justifiability for the “higher MIA” option.  
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Results 
Moderating Effect of Anticipatory Regret on Most Important Attribute Effect 
As expected, anticipatory regret significantly moderated the MIA effect, χ2(1) = 5.87, p < 
.05. The original MIA effect was replicated in the control condition: About 72% of participants 
chose the “higher MIA” option, χ2(1) = 6.12, p < .05 (see Figure 2). As expected, when regret 
was made salient preference for the higher MIA option was even stronger and increased to about 
94% of respondents, χ2(1) = 26.47, p < .05. Thus, the MIA effect was significant in the control 
condition and even amplified in the regret condition, consistent with our prediction.   
------------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
The Role of Perceived Justifiability 
 We again examined the role of perceived justifiability, as in the previous experiment. 
First, a binary logistic regression with perceived justifiability as the predictor of choice was 
significant in the expected direction (choice of higher MIA option coded as 0, other as 1), B = -
.87, SE(B) = .35, Exp(B) = .42, Wald (df=1) = 6.16, p < .05. Thus, justifiability perceptions 
predicted choice: the more justifiable an option was perceived to be, the more likely it was 
chosen. Second, ANCOVA showed that, controlling for participants’ age, perceived justifiability 
was affected by regret salience just as preferences were: the “higher MIA” option was perceived 
as a more justifiable choice in the regret condition (M = .87, SD = 1.56) than in the control 
condition (M = .26, SD = 1.53), F(1, 63) = 4.23, p < .05. 
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Discussion 
In this experiment, participants first matched two two-attribute options for desirability 
and then chose between them. Replicating the most important attribute (MIA) effect (Slovic, 
1975), most participants chose the option that had the higher value on the attribute they 
considered more important. As expected, the effect was even stronger in the regret salient 
condition than in the control condition. Justifiability perceptions predicted participants’ choices 
and were higher for the “higher MIA” option, as expected. Also, the justifiability of the “higher 
MIA” option was increased when regret was made salient. This confirmed our prediction that 
when the RBCE is driven by a normatively acceptable justification, regret salience increases 
preference for the reason-based option (in this case, the “higher MIA” option).  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Research suggests that individuals are highly concerned with the justifiability of their 
decisions (Montgomery, 1983; Pettibone & Wedell, 2000; Simonson, 1989; Slovic, 1975; 
Tversky, 1972). This desire for decision justifiability can lead to violations of fundamental 
principles of rational decision making, such as procedural invariance and regularity, and, thus, to 
biased choices, as illustrated by the reason-based choice effects literature (Shafir et al, 1993; 
Simonson, 1989). In the prototypical RBCE experiment, the “reason” favoring one option over 
another is “shallow but nice-sounding” (Simonson, 1989, p. 170). Decision makers’ desire to 
make justifiable choices leads them to rely on these irrelevant “reasons”, resulting in choices that 
violate normative principles.  
 While these findings are well-established in the literature, relatively little research has 
examined moderating variables that could attenuate RBCEs and reduce choice bias. In the 
present paper, we proposed that heightened regret salience might be such a moderator. As Janis 
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and Mann (1977) argued, heightened anticipatory regret can lead decision makers to engage in 
more vigilant, careful decision processing (cf. Connolly & Reb, 2005; Reb, 2008). Such 
increased vigilance should reduce or eliminate RBCEs when closer examination reveals them to 
be flawed, but not when they can withstand such scrutiny. 
 An earlier study (Connolly et al, 2010) showed that regret salience eliminated the 
asymmetric dominance or “decoy” effect (Huber et al, 1982). Experiment 1 replicated this 
finding for the select/reject effect (Shafir, 1993) and found that justifiability perceptions tracked 
preferences. Both effects are caused by decision makers’ reliance on normatively irrelevant task 
factors: the presence of a dominated decoy alternative in one, whether the choice task is to select 
or to reject one of two options in the other. Both effects were replicated in the control condition, 
but were significantly attenuated when the possibility of experiencing regret as a consequence of 
their choices was made salient to decision makers. In both cases the impact of the regret 
manipulation appears to have been to prompt a closer examination of, and thus to discredit, the 
shallow justification underlying the RBCE. 
 In Experiment 2 we predicted, and found, the reverse effect of regret salience in the most 
important attribute (MIA) effect (Slovic, 1975) when the justification underpinning the RBCE 
survives the closer examination triggered by the regret priming. In contrast to the decoy and 
select/reject effects, the justification for choice in the MIA effect was seen by pretest participants 
as normatively defensible (a view we broadly share). In Experiment 2, the MIA effect was 
replicated in the control condition and was even stronger in the regret-salient condition. As in 
Experiment 1, participants’ justifiability perceptions closely tracked their preferences. 
To the best of our knowledge the present research is the first to integrate two important 
streams of research in behavioral decision theory – decision regret and reason-based choice. Our 
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results suggest that anticipatory regret plays a significant moderating role in reason-based choice. 
Interestingly, Shafir (1993, p. 550), in his original paper on the select/reject effect, argued that 
regret aversion could not explain this effect. However, his argument was based on the then-
current model of regret, which held that regret was purely a function of the outcome of the 
chosen option relative to the outcome of the non-chosen option (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 
1982) – what Decision Justification Theory refers to as “outcome regret”. Such a model of regret 
aversion has difficulty in parsimoniously explaining the reason-based choice effect. However 
Decision Justification Theory proposes a second self-blame component of regret resulting from a 
feeling that the decision was unjustified (Connolly & Reb, 2005; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; 
Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002).  It is the avoidance of this second component of regret that 
amplifies or attenuates the RBCEs in our three experiments. 
The results thus add further support to Connolly and Zeelenberg’s (2002) proposal that 
outcome regret should be distinguished from self-blame regret associated with either the option 
chosen or the decision process used. The demonstration is especially compelling in the contrast 
between Experiment 1, where increased regret salience eliminated the RBCE, and Experiment 2, 
where it amplified it. In each case making regret salient appears to have produced more careful 
scrutiny of justification issues. In Experiment 1, as in Connolly et al (2010), this scrutiny 
revealed the unreasonableness of the RBCE justification, and the RBCE disappeared. In 
Experiment 2, the rationale appears to have survived the scrutiny and the justification was relied 
on more heavily when regret was salient, amplifying the RBCE. 
Taken together these findings add some empirical support to Janis and Mann’s (1977) 
suggestion that the anticipation of regret can lead to improved, more “vigilant”, decision making. 
The weakening of the select/reject effect in Experiment 1 and of the asymmetric dominance 
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effect in the earlier study at least reduced the influence of one normatively-irrelevant 
consideration from the decision process, and may have led to more thoughtful evaluation of the 
attribute tradeoffs involved. The strengthening of the most important attribute effect in 
Experiment 2 is normatively blameless, at least if it was used as a tie-breaking device between 
two equally-valued options. Enhanced regret salience thus seems to have improved decision 
making in all three experiments These results extend Reb’s (2008) recent findings that increased 
regret salience leads to more careful information search and deliberation during the decision 
process. 
Our findings are, of course, subject to the usual cautions concerning the use of student 
participants in brief laboratory studies using hypothetical scenarios.  It is worth noting, however, 
that the scenario methodology in which participants are asked to imagine how they would feel 
under certain circumstances is not used here as a cheap alternative to assessing actual emotions 
in real versions of these same circumstances. Whether or not the participants’ emotional 
expectations are accurate (and there is good reason to be suspicious: Gilbert et al, 2004), ex ante 
they are all the decision maker has for guidance. If a simple laboratory manipulation such as 
making regret salient does, in fact, lead a participant to think differently about a particular 
decision and to make a different choice, the accuracy of the expectations involved is not the focal 
issue. On the other hand the findings leave open for further research the question of whether or 
not this manipulation will have a similar effect on thoughts and choices in real decisions outside 
the laboratory. 
A limitation of concern to experimental economists is our use of self-reports of subjective 
beliefs (typically dismissed as “cheap talk”) and other failure to ensure incentive-compatible 
responses. We share this general concern, and are currently trying to devise real-money choice 
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tasks that show RBC effects paralleling those reliably found in the hypothetical choices used in 
the studies reported here. More broadly we see real potential in hybrid methodologies combining 
the rigor of experimental economics procedures with the soft, subjective variables of interest to 
psychological regret theory. For example, Reb (2008) and Reb and Connolly (2009) showed 
experimentally the effect of (soft) regret priming on real-money choices, though the monetary 
stakes were small. Kugler et al (2009) found substantial effects of such regret priming inductions 
on first-player contributions in a Trust Game with real-money payoffs ranging up to $60. 
Connolly and Butler (2006) used choices between real-money experimental gambles with 
substantial payoffs (up to $30) modeled on those used by Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (1991) 
but also including subjective self-report measures of the emotions subjects expected to 
experience for each possible outcome in the payoff matrix. These self-report measures added 
significantly to the prediction of actual gamble choices, and correlated well with ex post self-
reports of emotional reactions to the payoffs actually received (though not, as noted earlier, with 
the emotional experiences predicted by Regret Theory). These examples suggest that there may 
be real potential in hybrids of economic and psychological experimentation in building theory 
that is both psychologically rich and economically rigorous. (There are hints that hybrids 
involving brain imaging may also contribute to such progress. See, for example, Coricelli, Dolan 
& Sirigu, 2007).  
The findings provide an interesting footnote to the continuing debate about the 
functionality of emotions in decision making (e.g. Elster, 1996; Zeelenberg, 1999). Much of this 
debate (e.g. Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee & Welch, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2002) has emphasized the ability of the emotions to bypass or undermine 
rational decision processes. Other voices have emphasized the positive role emotions can play in 
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decision making (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Isen, 1993). The present experiments support the latter 
position: the anticipation of an emotion (self-blame regret) seems to lead to a cognitive 
reappraisal of an element of the decision process (the “reasons” underlying RBCEs) and, in turn, 
to an improvement in that process.  
A major recent theoretical paper by Mercier and Sperber (in press) provocatively argues 
that human reasoning abilities have their primary evolutionary roots in communication rather 
than in decision making, and are better suited to argument and persuasion than to analysis and 
consequential thought. The present analysis is entirely sympathetic to and compatible with 
Mercier and Sperber’s argument – indeed, the research on RBCEs is one of their main threads of 
empirical evidence. Our analysis, however, extends that of Mercier and Sperber in suggesting 
that humans may have also developed emotion-based mechanisms, such as regret and its 
anticipation, that can extend our argument-making skills into the balance and synthesis required 
for consequential thinking.  
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Figure 1: Relative Strength of Preference for Enriched and Impoverished Options as a 
Function of Choice Task and Regret Salience, Experiment 1 
 
 
 
 
(Relative Strength of Preference measured on a –100 to +100 scale with higher values indicating 
stronger preference for the impoverished option.)  
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Figure 2: Choice Frequencies of Options Higher and Lower on MIA as a Function of 
Regret Salience, Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
 
